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Abstract—Difficulty of safety-related software standards to 
help producing software for safe systems is discussed. Some 
research activity and other actions are proposed to focus on and 
possibly resolve long-lasting related problems. 
Keywords— standards; safety-critical-software. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In principle, safety-related software standards have a high 
potential for introducing valid, up-to-date research results into 
lifecycle processes. In fact, products resulting from these 
processes are admitted to public service only after 
conformance to standards has been demonstrated (typically in 
domains where authorities are established). This could be a 
powerful leverage for standards to give confidence to users 
(and to us, end-users) that innovation works for safer people 
and environment. 
However, this big potential is somehow unexploited, as 
there are various reasons why, in the authors’ judgment, a 
product declared conformant to a safety-related software 
standard is not necessarily, only on the basis of such statement, 
fit for safe use (efficacy argument). Here we just sketch some 
issues to justify this negative argument, together with possible 
research Actions (in italics) whose results might influence the 
various organizations of standards to mitigate the problems. 
Our argument is two-fold: 1) a general issue regarding the 
never-enough-studied process-product relationship, and 2) 
other issues, said “stakeholder-dependent”, regarding the way 
standards are created and used.  All were pondered over 
various years of experience matured at the “System and 
Software Evaluation Center” of the ISTI (that participates in 
standardization activity for ISO/IEC 15504, ISO 26262,  
EN5012x, and assesses processes of different organizations in 
various Countries). 
II. GENERAL PREDICTABILITY PROBLEM 
Various safety-related software standards (such as IEC 
61508-3, ISO 26262, EN 50128, DO-178B) mostly prescribe 
requirements, also assessment requirements, for software 
lifecycle processes [1]. Then the efficacy argument can be 
formulated in terms of the question: can quantitative, 
measurable process-product relationships be known and 
established? Some of the mentioned standards report this as 
unfeasible, and the software techniques prescribed (and other 
techniques that support achievement of safety integrity levels) 
are reported as qualitative approaches, as opposite to 
quantitative. Much research efforts have been spent on this 
theme: we only refer to one short but incisive survey [4], 
showing that the problem can hardly be solved and ended with 
a series of related research questions, that are still in the same 
(question) status. 
Actions: improve prediction ability, both deterministic and 
probabilistic, with controlled experiments and analysis of 
collected data. Propose that lifecycle-processes-oriented, 
safety-related standards also cover product characteristics the 
way the do with processes [1]. 
III. PROBLEMS FROM STAKEHOLDERS PERSPECTIVE 
More specific causes of inefficacy of standards are related 
to the way they are produced, the way they are adopted by their 
users, and the way conformance is intended by the standards 
themselves and by their users. 
A. Standard makers and their products 
Different profiles are involved in standards Working 
Groups: vendors, service providers and system integrators 
(most of them); technology suppliers (represented); academy 
and consultants (some); end-users representatives (none) have 
different views about acceptable risks, standard usage, safety 
goals and conformance demonstration. As a consequence, the 
real purpose that emerges about standard adoption may differ 
from the one stated in the standard foreword. 
Actions: balance (with well pondered criteria) the 
composition of working groups and include end-users 
representatives. 
Clauses in standards are themselves requirements, but 
sometimes lack the very properties of system/software 
requirements as predicated in the standard themselves (clarity, 
non ambiguity, completeness, consistency). 
Actions: creation of a study group to propose “quality 
requirements for standards” [2]. 
Management processes are little represented in most safety-
related standards. They are not less necessary than technical 
and support processes. Having lots of good engineers in a 
project and poor or no management, puts the project in greater 
risk to fail. 
Actions: increase safety management; include project risks 
(also explaining the difference from safety risks). 
In some popular standards there is little or no guidance 
about how and how extensively to use Techniques and 
Measures (T&M) to be conformant, and in particular how to 
adopt Formal Methods (FM). This is left to developers and 
third-party evaluators to judge. 
Actions: creation of a study group, to work in T&M 
recommendations, that includes FM experts. In particular, 
show how to apply FM by letting their advantages, limits, 
barriers to adoption, evolution known to stakeholders [3], 
would also be a progress in determining conformance. 
B. Standard users as developers 
We noticed different attitudes in different roles, both with 
software suppliers and with system integrators. 
For managers, standard conformance is scarcely perceived 
as a way to keep a project under control and is considered as a 
way to add commercial value to the product. 
For engineers, the burden of producing lots of documents 
results in having them issued later “to show to inspectors” and 
anyway not as a necessary input-output among activities. As a 
consequence, more clerical-like than substantial conformance 
is pursued, this sometimes resolving in higher cost. 
Actions: foster maturity of suppliers’ processes and of the 
procurement processes of system integrators and service 
providers. Reduce requests of verbose documents and explain 
how to compose and use documents.  
C. Standard users as third-party evaluators 
If not efficacy, is it possible to demonstrate at least 
conformance in an efficacious way? It seems more feasible 
than demonstrating fitness for safe use of a product. Such 
demonstration also suffers of a qualitative, and even more 
subjective, approach. As standards grant some liberty of 
interpretation in adopting software Techniques and Measures, 
also third party evaluators, not only developers, have their 
individual way to interpret conformance. This can generate or 
increase confusion both in suppliers and in system integrators 
about appointing independent evaluators. 
Different kinds of third-party evaluators have different 
titles, including that of accredited certification bodies. 
Certification, whose concept and practice are not clear to all 
involved stakeholders, may be requested by Authorities and 
can give false confidence that the certified system is “fit for 
use”, while certification is just the formal expression by the 
accredited body that inspections on project documentation and 
on the results of various test levels, executed before service, 
passed the (mostly qualitative) criteria set by the certification 
body. The fact that the certification body itself must be 
conformant to defined standards may increase the mentioned 
confidence, but the certification remains grounded on 
qualitative assessment results. 
Actions: Standards to clarify 3rd party evaluation roles, 
certification concept and process. Standards to indicate 
clearer procedures to demonstrate conformance, to shift focus 
toward pure (product, process) requirements than 
implementation aspects, and to define the role of the user 
stakeholders (general for B and C). 
IV. EXAMPLES 
Table I lists (respecting contractual confidentiality) 
examples of some of the problems found during assessments 
related with the issues mentioned here.   
TABLE I.  PROBLEMS FOUND WITH STANDARDS 
Issue Related problems/risks 
Lack of management guidance in 
EN 50128 (one of the reasons) 
Important Euro-train project failed. 
Relevant financial loss. 
Conflict of stakeholders views on 
using IEC 61508-3 
European big critical infrastructure 
control software project stuck. 
Inter Parts – inconsistency risk of 
new EN 50126 (standard quality) 
Standard development delayed –
problems with conformance 
demonstration. 
Different interpretations of Safety 
Integrity Level 0 (standard quality) 
Systems with safety-related 
software made as quality-related. 
Uncontrolled update by a vendor in 
a standard development (unjustified 
stakeholder’s view  prevailed) 
Risk that relevant portions of the 
update remain without being 
discussed and motivated. 
Ambiguities and incompleteness of 
ISO 26262-6 (standard quality) 
Risk of much variability in 
conformance determination. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The examples given above cannot be more precise because 
of non-disclosure agreements undersigned by the assessors and 
also for respect among colleagues. They also don’t express 
situations (excepting the first one) in which conformant-
declared products failed meet the “fit to safe use” requirement. 
However, they might show evident risk of that. In the authors’ 
intentions, the issues reported here (only part of more issues). 
These just support our position that a “satisfying degree of 
fitness for safe use” may only result from an “unplanned 
experiment”, and that there is little hope it can be determined at 
system delivery. However, there is hope that, if the standards’ 
quality is improved, the cost of such experiment can be greatly 
reduced.  
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